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Abstract: This descriptive paper examines the prevalence of 'WTO-plus' commitments in accession protocols of newly acceded Members, with a focus on commitments on the elimination of export duties. It presents preliminary results of a mapping exercise carried out with respect to these commitments and seeks to answer two questions.
First, can any general conclusions be drawn as to the prevalence of these commitments or are they, per definition, country-specific. Second, has the political nature of the WTO accession process allowed for the creation of a two-tier membership. The first question is answered by relying on data gathered as part of the ongoing PhD-research project conducted by the author.
The project aims to construct a typology of WTO-plus commitments to allow for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between these commitments and the baseline obligations in the covered agreements. The accession of China to the WTO is commonly considered as the prime example of the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols. The paper tries to answer the question whether this particular accession was truly unique in nature, or whether the inclusion of "Plus" obligations is less exceptional than often assumed.
Additionally, the accession protocols of other recently acceded-Members are examined to establish whether the hypothesis holds. In the PhD-research project this comparative methodology will also be applied to map WTO-plus commitments in other areas, such as antidumping and transparency. The second question will be answered in two stages. In a preliminary stage, international institutional law will be used to by analyzing the way in which the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has dealt with this type of WTO-plus commitment in its jurisprudence. The second stage deals with the question of hierarchy:
Accession Protocols are negotiated with the WTO Membership, by each country willing to accede to the WTO. This poses questions as to their exact position in the system of WTO law.
To establish whether evidence of a two-tier membership is present, one first has to turn back to the question whether Accession Protocols are a separate (or independent) legal instrument or an "integral part" of the WTO system of covered agreements. If newly acceded Members do not benefit from the general exceptions in order to balance their more stringent, WTOplus, obligations, this may support the conclusion that the membership of the World Trade Organization is becoming, in fact, two-tiered. 
Introduction
The accession process to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has not changed considerably compared to that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) .
1 It has remained highly political in nature. The process is characterized by a high degree of flexibility for incumbent Members to make accession of applicant States or Customs Territories conditional upon the acceptance of more stringent obligations. These types of obligations are commonly referred to as "WTO-plus" obligations or, where they provide for more flexibility for incumbent Members, "WTO-minus" rights. The main objectives of the research project are to provide a detailed typology of these commitments and to offer answers to the normative question whether the WTO accession process has allowed for the creation of a "two-tier membership". To this end, the project will analyze the prevalence of "WTO-plus" commitments in the accession protocols of Members that have acceded after 1994. The picture that will emerge from this analysis will explain whether there is a trend towards the inclusion of more stringent commitments in new Members' accession protocols or whether these commitments are purely negotiated on a country-specific basis.
This conference paper briefly summarizes the first two chapters of the PhD research project of the author, before presenting some initial outcomes of the third stage of the project.
In the first chapter, the WTO accession process is described in detail, including a discussion on the rationale for WTO accession. The second chapter analyzes the status of accession protocols in the WTO legal order as it will determine the relationship with other WTO agreements, and consequently, may have a bearing on the extent to which a Respondent in a dispute may rely on exceptions provided for in these agreements. This issue is particularly relevant considering that nearly all of the newly acceded Members, as well as the States and Customs Territories currently negotiating their accession, are developing countries. Retention of regulatory autonomy in the face of more stringent obligations is especially relevant for this particular group of countries, especially considering their (limited) negotiating capacity. The third stage encompasses a mapping exercise of "WTO-plus" commitments in accession protocols which serves as a basis for the creation of a typology of accession commitments.
The project discusses previous efforts by Charnovitz, Ehring, Qin and Yamaoka and aims to build upon their work, in particular with respect to obligations relating to the elimination of export duties. Finally, some preliminary conclusions are presented.
WTO Accession

Process
The accession process to the WTO is rooted in the GATT 1947. In comparison to GATT, the scope of the WTO is considerably broader. In addition to tariff schedules, which were the main focus of GATT-negotiations, it also includes rules on trade in goods, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and transparency obligations. 5 Hence, the amount of fields in which there is scope for the negotiation of more stringent commitments than those provided for in the baseline obligations has grown considerably.
2 VAN DEN BOSSCHE; ZDOUC, 2013, p. 156. 3 Ibid., p. 109. , not yet adopted, para. 5.27. The Appellate Body clarified that "this provision does not spell out the content of, or impose limitations on, such "terms". Rather, such terms are to be "agreed" upon by the WTO and the individual acceding Member during a specific accession process. 5 WILLIAMS, 2008, p. 55.
Accession Protocols in the WTO Legal Order
The status of accession protocols in the WTO Legal Order is not explicitly addressed by the WTO Agreement. 6 Panels and the Appellate Body have dealt with accession protocols in a number of cases. 7 To this date, no party to a dispute has challenged the enforceability of accession protocols. Consequently, practice in WTO dispute settlement indicates that Members, and in particular newly-acceded Members, accept that accession protocols are enforceable. have to adhere to in the future. However, given the highly political nature of the accession process, incumbent Members have insisted on the inclusion of 'rules' commitments in the working party reports that, together with the accession protocol, form the accession package.
State-of-the-art
The issue of accession commitments has received some attention in academic literature. Charnovitz was (one of) the first to develop a framework in which accession commitments could be categorized and compared. 18 In his view the starting point of such a framework should be the determination of the baseline obligations of WTO membership. commitments do not necessarily amount to WTO-plus commitments. In this part the focus is mostly on commitments on the elimination of export duties.
China
The accession process of China to the WTO can best be described as long and arduous. In 1986 China applied for the resumption of its original membership of GATT. Report lists a total of 143 paragraphs relating to commitments on specific matters. These commitments are incorporated into the accession protocol.
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Russian Federation
The accession process of the Russian Federation to the WTO was equally long and painstaking. The country formally applied for GATT membership in the summer of 1993, having become an observer to GATT two years earlier. 26 QIN, 1993 , p. 78. 27 QIN, 2003 AU, 2013 , p. 109. 28 QIN, 2003 . 29 Ibid., p. 491. One striking difference with China's accession commitments is that Russia will still be able to levy export duties on a wide array of products. Some analysts have pointed out that this should enable Russia to achieve its fiscal objectives and to pursue an industrial policy aimed at the modernization its economy. commitments related to specific matters in Paragraph 269. 36 Cape Verde confirmed in its accession protocol that it did not apply export duties, however it did not take up an explicit commitment stipulating that it would not do so in the future.
Montenegro
Montenegro was the first of four countries to accede to the WTO in 2012. PDR responded that these duties were essential for government revenue and development purposes. 44 As such, Lao PDR did not commit itself to phase out or eliminate export duties.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan became the 159 th Member of the WTO in 2013. At the moment of writing it is the last country to have joined the multilateral trade organization. Its Working Party Report contains 40 commitments relating to specific matters. 45 In its accession protocol, Tajikistan took up the commitment to eliminate all duties, taxes, fees and charges applied to exports, unless specifically provided for in Table 9 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994. Furthermore it committed itself to the obligation not to introduce new export duties. 
Prevalence of "WTO-plus" commitments
Focusing on commitments relating to the elimination of export duties, the evidence gathered by conducting the mapping exercise of "WTO-plus" commitments in accession protocols indicates that to a large extent they are negotiated on a country-specific basis.
Especially when the acceding member is a large economy with great export potential, incumbent Members seek to ensure that the accession package is crafted in a way that safeguards their defensive interests. In the case of China and Viet Nam, for example, acceding
Members included so-called Non-Market Economy (NME) methodology provisions in their accession protocols. 47 However, it is clear that certain commitments on specific matters are included almost across the board. This is particularly true for commitments on the elimination of export duties. Such commitments can be found in the accession protocols of, inter alia, Ukraine, China, Montenegro and Tajikistan. It appears that incumbent WTO Members typically insist on including a commitment on the elimination of export duties in protocols of acceding Members that typically export large quantities of raw materials. This is particularly true, of course, for China, but also for Tajikistan. More than 50% of Tajikistan's exports consist of 'raw aluminium' (HS 7601), amounting to almost $500 million annually.
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Similarly, Montenegro's largest export item is raw aluminium, making up 36.51% of its total exports. 49 Obviously, this hypothesis would have to be assessed empirically, but this simple observation points to the conclusion that WTO-plus commitments are mostly agreed on a country-specific basis and are dependent on the export profile of the acceding Member in question.
Conclusion: Evidence of a Two-Tier Membership?
This descriptive paper has offered a brief overview of the second and third chapter of One might argue that the division between developed, developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) also has created a multi-tiered membership. However, based on the preliminary results presented in this paper, one cannot but conclude that some newly acceded Members will be able to rely on one of the exceptions contained in another Multilateral Trade Agreement (e.g. GATT 1994), whereas others, even though under similar accession protocol obligations, will not. 48 Available at: <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/tjk/> (last accessed: 11 Aug. 2014). 49 Available at: <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/mne/> (last accessed: 11 Aug. 2014).
